عنوان مقاله [English]
The aim of the present article is to examine the strategies and decisions taken by the United States and North Korea and their outcome during North Korea nuclear crisis. In this direction the article has made use of John Bram’s Theory of Moves. From 1993 when the issue of North Korea nuclear program was considered as a crisis for world community, strategies and counter strategies were made by the United States and North Korea. These moves eventually led to production of nuclear weapon and nuclear tests by North Korea in the years of 2006 and 2009. Consequently the United States cut its economic aid to North Korea and imposed extensive economic sanctions against North Korea within the framework of the security council of the United Nations. From the viewpoint of the article each decision (move) taken by each side was for maximizing of interests and minimizing the threat. Of course these decisions had a close relation with the decision taken by the opposite party. Therefore, the strategies of the two countries were fluctuating within the framework of compromise or hardline position. The finding of the study shows that initially the aim of North Korea by producing nuclear weapon was not deterrence but, taking some concessions (security guarantees, fuel, and food) but taking into consideration what North Korea was considering as the United States obstructionism, led to hard decision of making nuclear weapon.